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Superimposing Title VII's Adverse Action
enr ent Retaliation
Requirement on First
Claims: A Chilling Prospect for
Government Employee Speech
Rosalie Berger Levinson·
Frequently, we see headlines with "disclosl.Jies,, being made by government employees
who have become disappointed and disillusioned by the operation ofgovernment The question
of whether govemment employees with this insid~ critical knowledge should have the n'ght to
come forward has been the subject ofnwnerous Supreme CoUJt and lower court decisio~ as
well as scholarly debate. Employees who cniicize their supervisoiS or challenge the efficacy of
departmental policies inevitably trigger the animosity of their superiors and thus face the
likelihood of being subjected to transfe~ negative evaluatio~ ha.rassmen~ or possibly
termination. On the other hancl for govemment to conduct its business in an orderly ~~ it
must have employees who demonstrate loyalty, who seek to work within the system, and who
strive to avoid intemal conflicts and rebellions that may hamper the ability ofgovemment to
deliver services to its citizens. A basic tension exists between the government's nght to operate
effectively and efficiently and the nght ofnearly twenty-one million fedeml, stat~ and local
government employees to disclose what they perceive is government wrongdoing, graff,
corruption, or simply ineptitude. Recognizing this tension, the Supreme Comt in Pickering v.
Board of Education held that comts must in each case "arrive at a balance" between these
competing interests.
The history of protecting the speech of govemment employees has been one of
expansion and subsequent contraction ofrights. Although, since 1983, the Supreme Court has
made it more difficult for employees to win retaliation cases, in geneml the Pickering test has
survived However, many appellate courts have been busy devising new tools for restricting the
speech rights ofgovernment employees. Appellate court decisions, primarily fivm the Second,
Fifl4 Eighth, and Eleventh Cilvuits~ have honvwed restrictive Title VII law and required that
government employees, who seek to recover for retaliatory misconduct; demonstrate a
significant alteration ofthe "conditions ofemployment', or a ~maten'al change in the tenns and
conditions of employment, in order to establish a prima facie case of a First Amendment
violation. Thus, whistle-blowing employees who ~wereJy, suffer involuntary transfers,
suspensions with pay, pubh'c or internal reprimands~ or other fo1ms ofretaliation not linked to
te1ms ofemployment have been barred fivm pursuing their constitutional claims, even though
such fo1ms ofretaliatory action might inhibit and deter them fivm engaging in protected speech.
Fwther, such decisions send a dangerous message to govemment employers that they may
penalize those who exercise their First Amendment n'ghts provided their retaliatory conduct falls
short ofa 'maten'al change"in the te1ms or conditions ofemployment
This Article traces the development ofSupreme Cowt doctrine regarding the question of
when retaliatoJY action should be viewed as an iniiingement of the fiee speech n'ghts of
govemment employees. For almost forty years, the Supreme Comt has roled that whenever
retaliatory conduct chills the reasonable employee fivm engaging in speech, the threshold of
constitutional injury has been met This sta.ndarlt which protects govemment employees fivm

*

Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. J.D. 1973, Valparaiso
University School of Law; M.A. 1970, B.A. 1969, Indiana University.

669

TULANE LAW REVIEW

670

[Vol. 79:669

any retaliatory action that chills speech, should be preserved, leaving the ~'severity ofthe harm"
inquiry to qssess damag(ls, not the question ofliability.
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Govemment employees are often in the bestposition to know what ails
the agencies for which they wor~· public debate may gain much /Tom

~wmro~~~~oo£

1.

1

·

INTRODUCTION

Assume you represent a group of govertnnent employees who
have uncovered what they believe is critical information revealing
dishonesty, illegality, or simply gross inefficiency and negligence
within their department. They wish to go public with their concerns,
but they fear retaliatory action by their supervisors. Frequently, we see
headlines with ''disclosures" being made by govermnent employees
who have become disappointed and disillusioned by the operation of
govermnent. The question of whether government employees with this
inside, critical lmowledge should be protected when they come
forward has been the subject of numerous United States Supreme
2
Court and lower court decisions, as well as scholarly debate.
L
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994); accordPickering v. Bd. ofEduc.!l
391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, .518 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1996);
see also Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2004) (''[T]he public's best protection
against [unscrupulous public employees] is the insider who is willing to speak up and shed
light on her colleagues' improprieties.''); Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 361·62 (5th Cir~
2004) (noting that ~'two experienced law enforcement trainers with expertise in weapons and
the use of force, are ideally placed to offer valuable public comment about excessive force
and the adequacy of police training and supervision," and thus these individuals have "a

particularly weighty First Amendment interest on their side of the Pickering scales''); Dangler
v. N.Y. City Off Track Betting Corp .., 193 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that
employee whistle-blowing regarding unlawful employer conduct should be given greater
protection than other forms of speech).
2.
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters ofPublic Concern: The Perils of
an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 25·51 (1990) (arguing
that the Court's jurisprudence is too restrictive on public employees' freedom of speech and
limits their right to whistle-blow, because it provides judges with too much discretion on
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Employees who criticize their supervisors or challenge the efficacy of
departrnental policies inevitably trigger the animosity of their superiors
and thus face the likelihood of being subjected to transfers, negative
3
evaluations, harassment, or possibly termination. On the other hand,
determining what type of speech is a matter of public concern); Lawrence Rosenthal,
Pennissible Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the
Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 539-67 (1998) (arguing that the Court's
current jurisprudence pennitting public employees to whistle-blow only if the speech
concerns a matter of public concern is inconsistent with other First Amendment jurisprudence
and is unduly burdensome on public employees); D. Gordon Smith, Beyond uPublic
Concem':· New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 249, 268-76
(1990) (advocating that the Court should replace its current fact-based inquiry on whether a
public employee's whistle-blowing conduct was a matter of public concern and therefore
protectable, by instead conducting an objective analysis on whether the whistle-blowing
conduct caused a "disruption of public efficiency"); Michael L. Wells, Section 1983~ the First
Amendmen~ and Public Employee Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and VIce
veiSa), 35 GA. L. REv. 939, 986-1005 (2001) (arguing that public employees who wish to
whistle-blow are hindered by the Court's vague, inconsistent First Amendment jurisprudence,
and advocating that they would be better served if the Court enacted a set of general rules
applicable to all circumstances, rather than making a fact-based inquiry in each case as is the
current law).
3.
Although retaliation may occur as a result of employee speech on a variety of
topics, the need to protect government employees who disclose wrongdoing, so-called
whistle-blowers, is well accepted. Congress adopted the federal Whistleblower Protection Act
(WPA) to provide protection for federal employees, and many states have followed suit. Pub.
L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 1201 note (2000)). For a
survey of state laws, see MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES, 260-73 ( 1992).
See also EHetta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whisdeblower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 99, 105-30 (2000) (giving an overview of state
whistle-blowing laws). I have previously argued that whistle-blowing should be viewed as a
distinct category of employee speech deserving of enhanced protection. Rosalie Berger
Levinson, SJ1encing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the Name of "Efficiency': 23
OHio N.U. L. REv. 17, 18-20 (1996). This is based on Supreme Court decisions that
recognize that the ability to criticize government and government officials is "the central
meaning of the First Amendment.'' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273
(1964).
Several of the cases discussed in this Article involve government employees who allege
they were retaliated against for disagreeing with their supervisors regarding the operation of
government offices, yet who are barred from bringing their First Amendment claims. See
Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 124 S. Ct. 82 (2003) (mem.) (describing a case in
which etnployees claimed they were retaliated against for participating in a state lawsuit
alleging that the School Board's decision to eliminate medical benefits for certain janitorial
employees and to reduce their working hours had a disparate impact on female employees in
violation of Louisiana state law, because all employees affected were female); Breaux v. City
of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 155-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (describing a case in which the plaintiff
alleged he was retaliated against for blowing the whistle on politically motivated
investigations of city council members by the city's top employees; further, the jury was
required by the court's charge to fmd that these allegations were true).
On the other hand, it may be argued that an employee who speaks out regarding issues
unrelated to his employment is entitled to even greater protection, because then the
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for govertnnent to conduct its business in an orderly way, it must have
employees who demonstrate loyalty, who seek to work within the
system, and who strive to avoid internal conflicts and rebellions that
may hamper the ability of government to deliver services to its
citizens. A basic tension exists between the governn1ent's right to
operate effectively and efficiently and the right of nearly twenty-one
million federal, state, and local government employees to disclose
what they perceive is government wrongdoing, graft, corruption, or
4
simply ineptitude. Recognizing this tension, the Supreme Court in
Pickering Y- Board of Education held that courts must in each case
5
"arrive at a balance" between these competing interests .
The history of protecting the speech of government employees
6
has been one of expansion and subsequent contraction of rights.
Although, since 1983, the Supreme Court has made it more difficult
for employees to win retaliation cases, in general, the Pickering test
7
has survived. However, many appellate courts have been busy
devising new tools for restricting the speech rights of govennnent
8
employees. Some have done this by borrowing the Supreme Court's
government's purported interest in the effective functioning of the office is at its lowest ebb.
See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477-80 (1995) (striking
down a federal law that prohibited federal workers from accepting money for speeches and
writings and reasoning that the law was invalid to the extent the content of the speech was
largely unrelated to the employment, whereas government employees could be restrained
from receiving remuneration for job-related speech). Some lower courts have similarly ruled
that when the employee's speech is about the management of the office, the speech is then
characterized as a personal grievance, rather than a matter of public concern. See, e.g.,
Khuans v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that a school
psychologist's criticism regarding school management was not of public concern); Holland v.
Rimmer, 25 F.3d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a county administrator could be
fired for his speech in disciplining subordinates because "[s]uch internal personnel matters
are not likely to arouse the public's interest and do not become matters of public concern
merely because they occur in a public agency"); Huang v. Bd. of Governors, 902 F.2d 1134,
1140 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is settled that a public employee's expression of grievances
concerning his own employment is not a matter of public concern."). The difficulty is in
separating speech that is totally self-interested from whistle-blowing, which should trigger the
greatest protection.
4.
The twenty-one-million figure is derived from U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 312 (2003).
5.
Pickering ·v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 56& (1968). In Pickenngand its progeny,
the Court has recognized that "Congress may impose restraints on the job-related speech of
public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large."
Nat'/ Treaswy Employees Umon, 513 U.S. at 465.
6.
See discussion infia notes 19-32 and accompanying text.
7.
See in/fa notes 33-34 and accompanying text; see also MARCY S. EDWARDS, JILL
LEKA, JAMES BAIRD & STEFANI£ LEE BLACK, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE PuBLIC WORKPLACE

29 (1998) (noting that the Pickering balancing approach remains the current standard).
8.
See, e.g., cases cited inITa notes 10, 13.
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holding that policymaking officials do not enjoy First Amendment
protection from patronage dismissals and applying it to deny free
9
speech rights of high-level government officials. They have ignored
the balancing analysis of Pickering and insulated employers from
liability in cases where policymakers are dismissed for engaging in
10
protected speech.
9.
See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1976) (holding that the First
Amendment right to freedom of association forbids government officials from discharging
public employees for engaging in partisan political activities). However, the Court also
recognized that political affiliation may be a pennissible criterion for certain polic
· g
positions where the government employer can establish that the employee occupies a position
for which party affiliation, loyalty, or confidence is necessary. Id at 366-67; see also Rutan v.
Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990) (holding that "promotions, transfers, and recalls"
based on political affiliation are impennissible infringements of First Amendment rights);
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (barring a state from firing an employee based
on political beliefs unless it can show that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement
for job performance). Decisions from several circuits have applied Elrod when a
policymaking employee is terminated for at least certain types of speech.
10. See, e.g., Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 922-25 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
po1ice commissioner, who was tenninated based on a memo criticizing the current deputy
and seeking to eliminate that position, was not protected; applying the Elrod-Branti approach,
rather than Pickering balance, and determining that the government should be permitted to
dismiss any policymaking or confidential employee who voices opinions on political or
policy-related issues); Garcia v. Kankakee County Hous. Auth., 279 F.3d 532, 533-35 (7th
Cir. 2002) (holding that the interim director of the housing authority may be discharged for
writing memos complaining about the chainnan 's conduct because of his policymaking
status; relying on Elrod and Bra.ntJ; the court reasoned that First Amendment does not protect
abstract statements of top employees who are responsible for setting objectives and
implementing political decisions, even though the plaintiff presented the case as a ConnickPickeringfree speech case, rather than a political association case); Vargas-Hamson v. Racine
Unified Sch. Dist., 272 F. 3d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that Ekod applies when
policymaking employees engage in speech relating to their political or substantive policy
viewpoints: "[T]he First Amendment does not prohibit the discharge of a policy-making
employee when that individual has engaged in speech on a matter of public concern in a
manner that is critical of superiors or their stated policies."); Fazio v. City & County of San
Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an assistant district attorney
discharged after filing papers to run against the district attorney is unprotected under the
Elrod-Bmnti line of cases because he is a policymaker). But see Curinga v. City of Clairton,
357 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that "Pickenngbalancing should be used when
termination is motivated by both a public employee's speech and political affiliation," but that
in cases involving policymakers, the government's interests are more likely to outweigh those
of the employee); Barker v. City of Del City, 215 F.3d 1134, 1139 (lOth Cir. 2000) (holding
that where the speech does not implicate the employee's politics or substantive policy
viewpoints, the policymaking exception does not apply and the court should instead apply the
Pickering balancing test); Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 976-83 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that because political reasons did not cause the county to withdraw its offer to a city
employee who criticized city programs, the Pickering balancing test applies rather than the
policymaking exception developed in Elrod; however, the employee's policymaking status
remains a critical factor in the Pickering balance, and here the county's interest in goverrunent
efficiency and workplace harmony justified its decision to rescind the offer to the plaintiff
because his speech undermined his credibility with several supervisors and there was a
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Other appellate court decisions, primarily from the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits,
have employed an even more inexplicable mechanism for constraining
11
and inhibiting speech. They have borrowed restrictive Title VII law
and required that government employees who seek to recover for
retaliatory misconduct demonstrate a significant alteration of the
"conditions of employment'' or a ''material change in the tertns and
conditions of employment" in order to establish a prima facie case of a
12
First Amendment violation. Thus, whistle-blowing employees who
"merely'' suffer involuntary transfers, suspensions with pay, public or
internal reprimands, or other fortns of retaliation not linked to terms of
employment have been barred from pursuing their constitutional

claims, even though such forms of retaliatory action might inhibit and
13
deter them from engaging in protected speech.
Further, such
reasonable belief that his employment would have created workplace dissention); Lewis v.
Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 162-65 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the policymaker exception does not
apply to free speech cases, although one's status as a policymaker may tilt the Pickering
balance toward the government); Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42, 46-47 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that policymakers who express their disagreements with their superior on a number
of policy and persotmel issues may be discharged under the Pickering balance when the
supervisor no longer has the necessary trust and confidence in them).
11.
12.

See discussion infia note 13.

The quoted terntinology stems from the text of Title VII, as well as cases

interpreting that language. See intra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
13. See Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 619 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a
public employee's First Amendment claim based on the court's ruling that, in order to prove
retaliation by a public employer, "the complained-of action must involve an important
condition of employment;' such as discharge, demotion, refusal to hire or promote, or
reprimand; although agents of the Board of Regents rated the plaintiff negatively and voted to
tenninate her, other agents later overrode the votes, thus allowing the plaintiff to keep her
position with the same pay and benefits, and the court reasoned that any emotional distress or
costs she incurred incidental to seeking review were too insubstantial to be an adverse
employment action); Meyers v. Neb. Health & Hwnan Servs., 324 E3d 655, 659-60 (8th Cir.
2003) (holding that the employment action must be a "material change in the terms or
conditions of ... employment" to be actionable and "[l]oss of status and prestige alone do not
rise to the level of an adverse employment action"; however, the district court erred in
granting summary judgment when fact questions remained as to whether reassignment
caused changes in the intangible employment conditions that were "significant or material");
Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d 705, 712-15 (8th Cir. 2002) (fmding that neither an involuntary
transfer, which resulted in "no diminution in title, position, salary, job responsibilities,
benefits, hours, or other material terms or conditions:' nor the presence of ''negative
memoranda in (her] personnel file,'' nor an internal investigation that resulted in "no material
disadvantage in a term or condition of employment" constitutes an adverse employment
action; to prove a constitutional injury the employee must establish "a tangible change in
duties or working conditions that constitute[s] a material disadvantage" (quotation omitted));
Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that "minor shifts in
employment responsibility [do] not significantly alter the conditions of [the plaintiff's]
employment'' and, therefore, do not constitute an adverse employment action); Bechtel v. City
of Belton, 250 F. 3d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that "adverse employment action
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decisions send a dangerous message to govermnent employers that
they may penalize those who exercise their First Amendment rights
provided their retaliatory conduct falls short of a "material change" in
14
Although treating
the terms or conditions of employment.
policymakers the same regardless of whether free association or :free
speech rights are at stake may be too simplistic as a matter of
15
constitutional law interpretation, superimposing federal statutory
must effectuate 'a material change in the tenns or conditions of ... employment''' in order to
establish a First Amendment violation) (quoting Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144
(8th Cir. 1997)); Serna v. City of San Antonio, 244 F.3d 479, 483-84 (5th Cir. 2001)
(reversing a trial court's award of damages to the chief of police in a whistle-blowing
situation, concluding that no reasonable jury would fmd that the transfer of the chief of police
amounted to "some serious, objective, and tangible ha1 n1," even though the transfer meant his
pension would be substantially reduced if he retired early); Breaux v. City of Garland, 205
F. 3d 150, 156-64 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that retaliation consisting of ''investigations,
criticisms, public ... reprimands, psychological and polygraph testing, suspension with pay,
[and a] transfer ... do not, either individually or collectively, constitute adverse employment
actions"; further, rescinded reprimands, even if the correction is unpublicized, and retaliatory
threats, which the court considers just "hot air," are not actionable); Benningfield v. City of
Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that an employee subjected to
accusations, an investigation, a transfer that involved change in hours, and denial of the
opportunity to attend a conference could not allege a First Amendment retaliation claim
because such activities do not constitute adverse employment actions); Harrington v. Harris,
118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[D]ecisions concerning teaching assignments, pay
increases, administrative matters, and departmental procedures, while extremely important to
the person who dedicated his or her life to teaching, do not rise to the level of a constitutional
deprivation." (quotation omitted)); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.Jd 702, 705-10 (5th
Cir. 1997) (holding that a series of retaliatory actions, including being reprimanded for not
being at her work station when the employee was in the Human Resources Department,
harassment and threats by coworkers that management ignored, receipt of negative
perfonnance appraisal that caused the employee to miss a salary increase, and the
requirement that she perform dangerous tasks, were not actionable); see also Phillips v.
Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[T]o prove a claim of First Amendment retaliation
in a situation other than the classic examples of discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote,
detnotion, reduction in pay, and reprimand, plaintiff must show that ( 1) using an objective
standard; (2) the total circumstances of her working environment changed to become
unreasonably inferior and adverse when compared to a typical ... workplace.").
14. The entrenchment of this new requirement is reflected in a recent article
discussing the First Amendment rights of government employees, which advises that "[i]n
order to constitute an adverse action, the employer's conduct must be materially adverse in
nature regarding the employee's terms and conditions of employment." William A. Herbert,
The FirstAmendment and Public Sector Labor Relations, 19 LAB. LAW. 325, 341 (2004).
15. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 48-52 (arguing that policymalcing may be a factor
in conducting the Pickenng balance, but it should not be determinative). The Supreme Court
in Pickering noted that the relationship between the employer and the employee and the need
for personal loyalty or confidence is a relevant concern, but it is only one of five factors
identified by the Court in detenuining whether First Amendment rights outweigh the
government's interest. See id at 50. For example, if a policymaker discloses serious
government corruption or wrongdoing, her right to speak out as well as the public's right to
hear this critical information may outweigh the government's interest in having a
"harmonious" workplace. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-73 ( 1968). The
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restrictions on First Amendment speech doctrine has no legitimate
rationale. There have been instances in which the Supreme Court has
used the United States Constitution to interpret statutes adopted by the
16
same Founding Fathers, but there appears to be no sound reason why
specific statutory text adopted in the 1960s and 1970s should be used
to restrict the breadth of the First Amendment, which became part of
17
our Constitution ahnost two hundred years earlier.
This Article traces the development of Supreme Court doctrine
regarding the question of when retaliatory action should be viewed as
an infringement of the free speech rights of government employees.
For ahnost forty years, the Court has ruled that whenever retaliatory
conduct chills the reasonable employee from engaging in speech, the
18
threshold of constitutional injury has been met. In Part III, the
requirement of an adverse employment action under Title VII is
discussed, focusing primarily on Title VII retaliation cases. In Part rv,
I demonstrate why the Rutan standard, which protects government
employees from any retaliatory action that chills speech, should be
'

Supreme Court has rejected the notion that certain classes of speakers are simply outside the
First Amendment, recognizing that ~'[t]he inherent worth of the speech in tern1s of its capacity
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source ...." First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,777 (1978). To hold that a government employee's speech can
be proscribed no matter bow significant the content and without balancing competing
concerns in the workplace is to cut off public debate on speech that lies at the core of the First
Amendment speech which is necessary to democratic self-government. As the Supreme
Court noted in Garrison v. Louisia.na, ''speech concerning public affairs is ·more than selfexpression; it is the essence of self-government.'' 379 U.S. 64,74-75 (1964); cf.Whitney C.
Gibson, Rethinkil1g the Sixth Circuits Erosion of First Amendment Rights m Rose v.
Stephens, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 767, 773 (2003) (arguing that the Elrod-Branti appro~ch is
appropriate where the speech exemplifies a political or substantive policy disagreement
between the policymaker and her employer that is so significant as to destroy the efficiency
and effectiveness of the working relationship). Because it is likely that this type of speech
would be deemed unprotected under the Pickenng balance, I see no need to apply the
mechanical Ekod-Bra.nti test rather than engage in the more fact-sensitive Pickering
approach. For example, in Lewis v. Cowen, the court recognized that "a public employer's
interests in numing an effective and efficient office are given the utmost weight where a highlevel subordinate insists on vocally and publicly criticizing the policies-of his employer.'' 165
F. 3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 1999). However, the court refused to simply substitute Elrod for the
more nuanced Pickering balance. Jd at 162-63.
16. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass-'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 385-86
(1982) (holding that provisions of the Reconstruction Era prohibiting race discrimination,
more specifically 42 U.S.C. § 198l(a) (1982)~ are restricted to intentional discrimination
because the same Congress that enacted this law also adopted the Fourteenth Amendment,
which has been interpreted to reach only intentional discrimination).
17. See discussion infi'a Part rv.
18. See iniTa notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing Rutan v. Republican
.

Party; 497 U.S. 62 (1990)).

.
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preserved, leaving the "severity of the harm" inquiry to assess
damages, not determine liability.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL VIEW

Before the 1960s, the Supreme Court freely allowed a
govermnent employer to retaliate against employees for engaging in
19
First Amendment activitieS. In his classic articulation of the "rightprivilege distinction," then-Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice
Holmes in McAuliff v. Mayor of New Bedford stated that "[t]he
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
20
constitutional right to be a policeman.'' As late as 1952, in Adler v.
Board of Education, the Court continued to reason that although
government employees have the right "to assemble, speak, think and
believe as they will ... they have no right to work for the State in the
21
school system on their own terms."
fu 1967, the Court overruled Adler and fortnally rejected this
doctrine, declaring that governn1ent cannot condition employment on
22
relinquishing First Amendment rights: One year later, in Pickering ·v.
Board ofEducation, the Court held that a public school teacher could
not be dismissed for writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the
School Board's allocation of funds to educational and athletic
23
Justice Marshall observed that courts must strike a
programs.
"balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
24
Justice Marshall
services it perfonns through its employees."
conceded that free speech rights of government employees do not
enjoy the same protection as those of private citizens because the
19. Sec Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 721 (1951); United Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102-03 (1947)~
20. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). For a
broader discussion of the development and eventual decline of the "right-privilege
distinction," see generally William W Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
21. Adlerv. Bd. ofEduc., 342 U.S. 485,492 (1952).
22. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) ("[T]he theory that
public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions,
regardless of how unreasonable, has been unifonnly rejected." (quotation omitted)); see also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv: 1413, 1415 (1989)
(discussing how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions protects employees' free speech
rights).
23. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1968).
24. ld at 568.
'

'
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state's interest "in regulating the speech of its employees ... differ[s]
significantly from those it p.ossesses in connection with regulation of
25
the speech of the citizenry in general." Nonetheless, the Justice also
emphasized the importance of "free and open debate ... to infortr1ed
26
decision-making by the electorate." Because school teachers were
most likely to have informed opinions on the topic of school funding
and budgetary matters, the Justice stated that ~'it is essential that they
be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory
27
dismissaL" Although the Court did not set down specific standards as
to how the balance should be struck, Justice Marshall's opinion
imposed the burden on government to prove the restriction on speech
was necessary to prevent actual impainnent of the efficient operation
28
of the services it perfonns as an employer.
Since Pickering, the Supreme Court has rendered a few decisions
that, while generally preserving Pickering, have eviscerated the broad
protection for speech envisioned by Justice Marshall. In Connick v.
Myers, the Court made it more difficult for government employees to
succeed in their retaliation claims by requiring them to first prove that
29
their speech involved a matter of public concem. Further, Connick
25. !d.
26. Id at 571-72.
27. /d. at 572. Indeed, the Court rejected the notion that the speech would be
wtprotected if some of the teacher's statements were false or damaging to the reputation of
the board and superintendent. Id at 570-72. The Court reasoned that absent proof that false
statements were made knowingly and recklessly by the teacher, he could not be
constitutionally retaliated against for this sp,eech. Jd at 574-75.
28. See id. at 572-74. The lower courts understood the decision to require that the
employer raise and establish the unprotected character of the employee's speech by
demonstrating that the employee's expression "materially and substantially" interfered with
the discharge of duties and responsibilities~ See, e.g., Conner v. Reinhard; 847 F.2d 384, 39192 (7th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that because "[t]he public has a legitimate interest in receiving
infonnation concerning abuse[s] within public institutions,'' evidence of the actual effects of
spe,ech is necessary before a court can fmd that an employer's functions have been
substantially impeded so as to remove protection from an employee's speech); Nat'l Gay Task
Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (lOth Cir. 1984) (noting that the state's interests
outweigh the employee's "interests only when the expression results in a material or
substantial interference or disruption in the normal activities of the [workplace]''; an
employer must prove that the "restriction is necessary to prevent the disruption of official
functions or to insure [an] effective perfonnance by the employee;.,).
29. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983). In a five-four decision, the
Court held that the threshold question must be whether the employee speech is a matter of
public concern. Id. The Court reasoned that to "presume that all ,matters which transpire
within a government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remarkand certainly every criticism directed at a public official would plant the seed of a
constitutional case." ld at 149. The Court advised that this detennination -would be made by
examining the fonn, context, and content of the speech. ld at 147-48'. The decision thus
redefined and narrowed the definition of what speech would be worthy of the ''public
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established that a likelihood that speech may cause disruption, rather
than evidence of actual disruption, sufficed to defeat the employee's
30
speech claim. Subsequently, in ltaters v. Churchill, the Court made it
concern" label. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 30-38 (criticizing this development); see also
IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL GoVERNMENT CML
RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:10 nn.l9-40 (1991 & Supp. 2004) (collecting cases from various
circuits regarding which types of speech will and will not be deemed to be a matter of public
concern); Estlund, supra note 2, at 50-51 (arguing that the "matter of public concern"
requirement is vague and subjective); Herbert, supra note 14, at 328-37 (describing the
various types of speech that might or might not qualify as speech of public concern).
30. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. The Court balanced Myers' First Amendment
right to free speech against the government's interest in "the effective and efficient fulfillment
of its responsibilities to the public." Id at 150. Concluding that most of Myers' speech,
which consisted of a questionnaire regarding office morale that she distributed to coworkers,
did not constitute a matter of public concern, the Court deferred to the employer's decision
that the insubordination manifested by that questionnaire posed a threat to efficiency and
close working relationships. ld at 151-52. Initially it appeared that the requirement of actual
disruption might be retained when the employee's speech more clearly involved a matter of
public concern, because the Court suggested that the stronger the employee's showing that the
speech was of public concern, the greater the burden on government to justify its adverse
action. Id at 152. However, a plurality opinion in Uiite.l8 v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994),
commented that actual tangible interference with the operation of government was rarely a
factor in the Court's decisions, but rather "we have given substantial weight to government
employers' reasonable predictions ofdisruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter
of public concern." ld at 673 (emphasis added). But see Levinson, supra note 3, at 41-48
(critiquing this development). The trend in the lower courts has been to allow public
employers to sanction employee speech based on fear of disruption, even absent evidence of
actual disruption. See Sheppard v. Beerman, 317 F. 3d 351, 355 (2d Cir.), cert. demed 124 S.
Ct. 135 (2003) (mem.) (holding that discharge does not violate the First Amendment when an
employer's prediction of disruption is reasonable and such is enough to outweigh value of
speech); Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 372 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the relevancy of
plaintiff's contention that his news release did not ignite actual disruption in the workplace
because an employer need not establish actual disruption when a threat of future disruption is
obvious); Rash-Aldridge v. Ramirez, 96 F.3d 117, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
plaintiff was properly removed from the board based on the potential disruptive effect of her
speech in failing to represent the interests of the city council and supporting a project
opposed by the council of which she was a member); Watters v. City of Philadelphia, 55 F. 3d
886, 895-99 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that, after Mte.IS', it is no longer necessary to show actual
disruption, although the government must make a substantial showing that the speech was in
fact likely to be disruptive); Jeffiies v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that,
based on U'atei.S', the government's burden is to make a substantial showing of likely
interference and not actual disruption); Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1344 (8th
Cir. 1993) (noting that, after Connick, demonstration of actual disruption in the workplace is
not required; "[r ]ather, the amount of disruption that a government employer must tolerate
depends on ... the extent to which the speech addresses a matter of public concern" as well
as "the type of service the employer provides ... and the context of the speech"). But see
Gazarkiewicz v. Town of Kingsford Heights, 359 F.3d 933, 943-45 (7th Cir. 2004) (fmding
that a town was not justified in firing an employee who typed a citizen's complaint against the
Superintendent of Public Utilities, which was then printed and distributed, because the speech
was of public concern and because the goverrunent, although not required to show actual
proof of disruption, did not even show a reasonable prediction of disruption); Nunez v. Davis,
169 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a court administrator who was fired by a
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more difficult for govertnnent employees to establish that speech,
assutning such is protected, was a substantial or motivating factor in
31
the adverse treatment. The Court, in a plurality opinion authored by
Justice O'Connor, held that the _public employer need conduct only the
same type of reasonable investigation as a private employer would in
32
determining the content of an employee's speech.
Although these de.cisions have made it more difficult for
government employees to bring their actions, the Court has retained
the core principle that the public employer ultimately has the burden of
justifying its retaliatory action by proving that the employee's speech
interfered with, or was highly likely to interfere with, govermnent
33
operations. Many litigants have succeeded in demonstrating that their
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, and that government
officials who take retaliatory action may be held individually liable for
34
violating clearly established First Amendment law.
judge because of her expressive conduct could not be dismissed absent real, not imagined,
disruption, and here there was no noticeable difference in the working relationship); Curtis v.
Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. Bd., 147 F.3d 1200, 1213-14 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holding that absent a
showing of any actual disruption attributable to comments regarding racial equity made by
the school's equity/aflnmative action officer, the Pickering balance weighs in favor of
plaintiff); Johnson v. Multnomah County, 48 F.3d 420, 426-27 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that

when an employee was critical of her supervisor, the county had to show more than mere
disruption; actual injury to legitimate interests is required because, otherwise, allegations of
wrongdoing would be suppressed because disruption necessarily accompanies such
exposure).
31.
Uflters, 511 U.S. 661.
32. Id at 676-77. Justice Souter, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that "in order
to avoid liability, the public employer must not only reasonably investigate the third-party
report, but must also actually believe it." Id at 682-83 (Souter, J., concurring); see also
Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1998) (relying on W8tem, the court
accepted findings of an investigation conducted by defendants in detennining whether the
employee's speech addressed a matter of public concern; when there is a dispute about what
an employee actually said, courts should accept the facts as the employer reasonably found
them to be).
33.
See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995);
lliltel3', 511 U.S. at 673-74; see also Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2004)
("[T]he Supreme Court has held that the goverrunent may not punish the speech of a public
employee if it involves matters of public concern unless the state can prove that the needs of
the government outweigh the speech rights of the employee.").
34. Se~ e.g., Settlegoode v. Portland Pub. Sch., 371 F.3d 503, 516 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the magistrate erred in entering judgment as a matter of law following a jury
verdict in favor of a teacher on her First Amendment retaliation claims because the law was
clearly established, even under the Pickering balance, that a school teacher who speaks out
challenging the deficiency of a school program for disabled students was speaking on a
matter of public concern, and evidence of any disruption was minor and was outweighed by
the interest in allowing the teacher to express herself; thus, school officials were not entitled
to qualified immunity from this claim); Rivera-Jimenez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir.
2004) (fmding that the defendants did not enjoy qualified inununity from a claim brought by
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In general, the following analysis has emerged from the Supreme

Court cases- Initially, the court must decide whether the employee
35
engaged in speech addressing a matter of public concem. This
determination will be made by a full assessment of the content, form;
36
and context of the speech. Second, the employee must prove that the
37
retaliatory action was motivated by this speech. Third, the court must
balance the employee's speech rights against the employer's interest in
38
the efficient functioning of the office. Finally, the employer may still
government employees because the right to be free of retaliation for exercising their free
speech rights concerning alleged corruption in Puerto Rico's Department of Justice was
clearly established); Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that the law was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes that a deputy district
attorney could not be retaliated against for sending a memorandum to his supervisors alleging
that a deputy sheriff included false statements in a search warrant affidavit; it was clear that
such speech addressed a matter of public concern and that the attorney's interest in making
this disclosure outweighed the government's interest in avoiding disruption, and thus
defendants were on notice that the Pickenng balance favored the plaintiff); Mihos v. Swift,
358 F.3d 91, 109-10 (1st Cir. 2004) (deciding that a reasonable official should have known
that terminating a public official simply because he cast his vote on a matter of public
concern contrary to the wishes of the appointing authority violated clearly established rights,
and thus this conduct was not insulated by qualified immunity; "[n]o reasonable public
official could have failed to realize that a member of a public instrumentality cannot be
terminated on such grounds"); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783-85 (4th Cir~ 2004)
(finding that, although the particularized balancing required under Pickering makes it
difficult to meet the ~'clearly established" test, a teacher~s speech in opposition to race
discrimination against elementary school children was so clearly protected that a reasonable
superintendent should have known that taking retaliation in response to such speech,
especially where it was not disruptive to the point of jeopardizing the welfare of the children,.
was protected, and thus the superintendent was not entitled to qualified immunity for his
action in demoting. the teacher)~
35. See Conmck, 461 U.S. at 146-48.
36. See id. at 147-48.
37. See, e.g., Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca; 329 F. 3d 422, 426-28 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding that absent evidence that city council members were aware of employee's speech
before they took their discharge vote, it cannot be e.stablished that dismissal was
"substantially motivated" by that speech); Ambrose v. Township ofRobinson, 303 F.3d 488,
493-94 (3d Cir. 2002) (fmding that even if there is temporal proximity between the protected
activity and the adverse action, an employee must still show that decisionmakers were aware
of the protected conduct); Nieves v. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 690, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2002)
(deciding that the timing of events was insufficient to create a triable issue of fact when the
employee could not show that the actual decision was made after the protected speech, and
thus summary judgment was appropriate); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 746-47
(lOth Cir. 1999) (holding that mere temporal proximity of the speech to the discharge is
insufficient, without more, to establish a retaliatory motive, and thus the employee's First
Amendment claim failed).
38. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Although the court,
rather than the jury, engages in the Pickering balancing, generally underlying factual disputes
whose resolution might affect this balance should be decided by the jury. See, e.g., Brochu v.
City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1156-61 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that although the
Pickering balance involves a question of law for the court, there may be cases where factual
disputes must be resolved by the jury before the court can make this detennination); Gom1an-
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prevail if it carries its burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the same action would have been taken even if the
39
plaintiff had not engaged in protected speech.
With regard to the retaliatory conduct, there must be an
assessment of whether the adverse action has · · ged upon First
Amendment rights. Although defining". · gement" has proved to
40
be a difficult task with regard to many fundamental rights, the
Supreme Court has provided fairly clear guidance as to when
retaliatory conduct sufficiently burdens speech so as to trigger the
Pickering balance test. It is important to note that a finding of
. . . . . . · gement'' does not mean that a court must find a First
Amendment violation. It simply means that the employee has met the
threshold necessary to proceed with the First Amendment analysis.
As to this · · gement question, the Supreme Court in Rutan VRepublican Party explained: "[T]he First Amendment . . . already
protects state employees not only from patronage dismissals but also
from 'even an act of retaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday
party for a public employee . . . when intended to punish her for

Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 556-58 (2d Cir. 2001) (imding that factual
disputes precluded swnmary judgment on the Pickering balancing issue; it is only after such
disputes are resolved by a fact finder that the court can come to its own legal conclusions
about whether the employer's inefficiency outweighs the employee's interest in free speech);
Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 880-82 (8th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that although the
balance of the interests is a matter of law for the district court, the underlying factual
questions should be submitted to the jury, generally through interrogatories or a special
verdict form); Myers v. Hasara, 226 F.3d 821, 826-28 (7th Cir. 2000) (deciding that factual
disputes relating to the factors to be considered in the Pickering balance precluded summary
judgment).
39. See Bd. of Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675-76 (1996) (discussing these
elements); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
(discussing the last element); see also Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2004).
Spiegla interpreted Mt. Healthy to impose a three-step analysis. ld First, the court must
determine whether the employee's speech enjoys protection. Id Second, the employee must
establish that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the retaliatory action. /d
Third, the employer has the opportunity to prove it would have taken the same action in the
absence of the employee's protected speech. Id
40.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITIJTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ I 0.1.2 (2d ed. 2002). Professor Chemerinsky notes that the Supreme Court has provided
little guidance as to when government action that burdens the exercise of a right, rather than
prohibiting it, should be deemed an infringement. ld As discussed in this Article, the
Supreme Court has determined that government action that chills employee speech infringes
on the First Amendment. See infia notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing Rutan v.
Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990)). Thus, lower courts are not free to impose new
constraints that require employees to prove anything more than that the retaliatory action
would deter the reasonable employee from engaging in protected speech.
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1

exercising her free speech rights."~ The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had proposed that only politically
based employment decisions that are "the substantial equivalent of a
42
dismissal" violate the First Amendment. The Supreme Court found
this standard unduly restrictive, because it failed to recognize that less
43
harsh deprivations can also chill speech. Significantly, the Court
rejected the employer's argument that patronage practices that did not
have an adverse effect on terms and conditions of employment were
44
not actionable. The Court recognized that employers could deter
speech through other retaliatory action, even if such could not be
characterized as a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions
45
of employment.
This same deep concern about chilling employee speech was a
core factor in the Supreme Court's 1995 decision invalidating portions
of the Ethics Reform Act that barred employees from receiving
46
honoraria for their speech activities. In Umted States v. National
Treasmy Employees Union, the Court recognized that preventing
41. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76 n.8 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party, 868 F.2d 943, 954
n.4 (7th Cir. 1989)).
42. Rutan, 868 F.2d at 949.
43. See Rutan, 491 U.S. at 75.
44. See id at 73. Prior to Rutan some courts had argued that the retaliatory harm
must be severe, and thus insubstantial changes in an employee's work conditions, even when
retaliatory and even where such might reasonably chill an employee's exercise of the right to
free political association~ were not actionable. The rationale was that allowing such claims
"would cause a level of burden that is almost certainly outweighed by the government's need
to protect its own interest." Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1217 (1st
Cir. 1989). Rutan made it clear that the relevant question is whether the retaliatory action
deters speech. 497 U.S. at 75. Others continue to argue, however, that the assessment of the
level of harm should be done at the initial stage in order to prevent "constitutionalizing
employee grievances." Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F. 3d 318, 329 (2d Cir. I 996) (Jacobs, J.,
concurring); see also Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd., 232 F.3d 1334,
1339-41 (lOth Cir. 2000) {reasoning that although Rutan made clear that deprivations less
harsh than dismissal would violate a public employee's rights, it does not mean that all acts,
no matter how trivial, are sufficient to support a retaliation claim; allegations that plaintiff
was subjected to a Professional Development Plan, which required her to strive to create a
more collaborative work environment, and to attend Monday morning meetings to discuss
complaints that had been made about her by other teachers, were "of insufficient gravity to
premise a First Amendment violation"); Acosta-Orozco v. Rodriguez-de-Rivera, 132 F. 3d 97,
10 I n.5 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that Rutan's footnote 8 is "colorful rhetoric" but does not
foreclose rules that allow public employers to take actions which fall short of demotions or
transfers); Pierce v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 n.l (5th Cir. 1994)
("We choose not to read the Supreme Court's dicta literally; rather, we apply the main
analysis of Rutan to retaliation claims and require more than a trivial act to establish
constitutional harm.").
45. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 73.
46. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 463 ( 1995).
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compensation for speech may deter, and thus infringe on, protected
41
speech rights. It reasoned that the Act's "large-scale disincentive to
Government employees' expression . . . imposes a significant burden
on the public's right to read and hear what the employees would
otherwise have written and said.'~ The ·detertnination of whether
retaliatory conduct is substantial enough to "chill" speech is
concededly open-ended, but Rutan and National Treasmy demonstrate
that the Supreme Court has broadly construed the "chilling effect"
standard to protect government employees who are exercising their
49
First Amendment rights.
Following Rutan's lead, many lower courts have recognized that
employees alleging free speech violations may proceed with their
claims provided the retaliatory conduct would deter the average
5
individual from engaging in protected activity. ° For example, in
Fanner v. Cleveland Public Power, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff need only "suffer an injury
that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing
to engage in that [constitutionally protected] activity" in order to state
1
an actionable claim.5 In Farmer, the court found that reduction of a
plaintiff's job responsibilities would qualify where the change arguably
transformed plaintiff from a policymaking, supervisor-level employee
52
to someone engaged in merely perfonrung clerical tasks. In Spiegla
v. Hull, the Seventh Circuit held that an employee's transfer to a more
physically demanding and less skilled position and an unfavorable
change in her work schedule could form the basis of a First
Amendment retaliation claim because such actions were sufficient to
53
Finally, in Edwards v. City of
deter exercise of free speech.
8

4 7. See id. at 466-67.
48. Id at 470.
49.
See id. at 466-70; Rutan, 491 U.S. at 73.
50.
See, e.g., Farmer v. Cleveland, 255 F.3d 593, 602 (6th Cir. 2002); see also infm
notes 120-129 and accompanying text (discussing decisions that have specifically rejected the
Title VII analysis in favor of the "chilling effect" approach).
51. Farmer v. Cleveland Pub. Power, 295 F.3d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 2002) (quotation
omitted) (alteration in original); see also Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F. 3d
968, 977 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "[t]he denial of ... a 'trivial' benefit may fonn the basis
for a First Amendment claim where the aim is to punish protected speech"; thus a hospital
could be held liable for subjecting a physician to an investigation that threatened revocation
of his clinical privileges and for filing an adverse action report against him).
52. 295 F. 3d at 602.
53. 371 F.3d 928, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Thomsen v. Romeis, 198 F.3d
1022, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928
(7th Cir. 2004) (implying that even three reprimands may be actionable if they create the
potential for chilling employees' speech on matters of public concern, even when the
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Goldsboro, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the First Amendment prohibits an employer from making
threats to discharge an employee in an effort to chill the exercise of the
54
employee's First Amendment rights.
Further support for the notion that any government conduct that
chills speech should be actionable as a violation of the First
Amendment is found in the Supreme Court's analysis in Board of
55
County Commissioners v. Umbehr. In Umbehr, the Court held that
the Pickering balancing test should be extended to apply to an
independent contractor, who alleged he lost a government contract in
6
retaliation for engaging in speech. 5 The Court noted that a contractual
relation, like an employment situation, provides a valuable financial
benefit and that the loss of this benefit "in retaliation for speech may
chill speech on matters of public concern by those who, because of
their dealings with the government, 'are often in the best position to
57
know what ails the agencies for which they work."' Although it was
argued in Umbehr that loss of one government contract should not be
equated to loss of one's job, the Supreme Court recognized that the
chill on First Amendment rights could nonetheless be real and thus
58
such claims are ,actionable. As in Rutan, the Supreme Court focused
on whether certain government conduct chilled speech,-not on whether
the adverse action could be-characterized as a material or substantial
9
employment action.s
consequences might appear somewhat speculative); Smith v~ Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 649 n.3 (7th
Cir~ 1994) (''[E]ven minor fonns of retaliation can support a First Amendment claim, for they
may have just as much of a chilling effect on speech as more drastic measures.'').54. 178 F. 3d 231 ~ 246-47 (4th Cir. 1999); see also B,elcher v. City of McAlester, 324
E3d 1203, 1207~ n.4 (1Oth Cir. 2003) (recognizing that "[t]hreats of dismissal based on an
employee's speech may constitute adverse employment action"; the cowt found that
reprimanding a firefighter would have a chilling effect on other employees who wished to
disclose departrnental wrongdoing); Bass v. Richards, 308 F. 3d 1081, 1087-88 (1Oth Cir~
2002) (finding that a reserve deputy who alleged he was stripped of his reserve conunission
for supporting the sheriff's opponent in an election was deprived of a benefit "that could
inhibit speech and thus could infringe on [the employee's] First Amendment rights'~ and ''the
government infringes upon protected activity whenever it punishes or threatens to punish
protected speech").
55. 518 u.s. 668 (1996).
56. Id at 673; see also O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712;
714- I 5 ( 1996) (extending the protection afforded government employees terminated for
patronage reasons to independent contractors in a companion case).
57. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 ( 1994)).
58.
See id.
5'9. See id at 674-76; see also Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723,726-27 (lOth Cir.
1996) (holding that exercise of free speech does not depend upon receipt of a fuJI-time saJary,
and thus volunteers are entitled to First Amendment protection under Pickering and
Connick); Brown v. Disciplinary Comm., 97 F.3d 969, 972-73 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
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Decisions from the United States Supreme Court have not
deviated from the Rutan- Umbehr principle that infringement of First
Amendment rights is established when a public employee can show
that the government conduct chills the exercise of the right~ ° Further,
outside the context of government employment, the need to protect
citizens from government action that inhibits speech is a well
61
established part of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. It
reflects the broader notion that "speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the ~ssence of self-govermnent.'~
Nonetheless, decisions from several appellate courts have begun to
erroneously borrow the jargon from Title VII case precedent to impose
a new obstacle on government employees alleging violation of their
63
Rather than demonstrating that the
First Amendment rights.
retaliatory conduct chills speech, employees in some circuits are
required to make a. threshold showing that the retaliation caused a
6

2

volunteer frrefighter was protected by the First Amendment because under state law he
enjoyed some of the benefits of an employee).
60. SeeUmbehr, 518 U.S. at 674.
61. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that
allowing public officials to recover in defamation actions would result in self-censorship by
those who wish to criticize the operation of the government and that, absent a showing of
actual malice, the imposition of liability would be inconsistent with the spirit and goals of the
First Amendment); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (expressing
concern that ~'the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling
effect on private speech"). The same concern is reflected in the Court's standing
jurisprudence, which dictates that a person may challenge a statute on the ground that it
violates the First Amendment rights of third parties not before the Court, even though the law
is constitutional as applied to him, based on the fear that an overbroad law will chill protected
speech. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) ("Litigants, therefore, are
permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated,
but because of ajudicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.").
This extraordinary departure from the ordinary rules of who may assert Article III jurisdiction
reflects the special value the Court has placed on First Amendiilent rights. See also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, § 11.2.2 (discussing the overbreadth doctrine).
62. Garrison v. Louisiana~ 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); seealsoNouche v. City of Park
Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[C]riticism of public officials lies at the very core
of speech protected by the First Anl.endment."). Constitutional theorists have long recognized
that freedom of speech is crucial in a democracy. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in
First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B~ FoUND. REs. J. 523, 542 (arguing that freedom of
speech serves an essential "checking value" on government, ensuring against abuse of power
by government officials); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First An1endment Is an Absolute, 1961
SUP. ·CT. REY. 245, 255 ("Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory,
casting.a ballot is assumed to express.").
63. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir~ 2000) (discussing
divisions among the circuits).
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"materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of
employment.',M

Ill.

TITLE VII's REQUIREMENT OF AN ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits disparate
treatment on the basis of race, religion, sex, and national origin with
regard to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.',t)s Title
VII also bans retaliatory discrimination against those who complain of
66
Title VII violations. The retaliation provision makes it "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate" against
someone who has opposed an employer's unlawful behavior or
6
participated in a Title VII proceeding. ' Despite the broad language in
the text, the federal appellate courts are divided as to how much harm
an employee must endure before claims of disparate treatment or
68
retaliation are .actionable under Title Vll. As to retaliation claims,
which are most relevant to the First Amendment question, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Ray v. Henderson,
explained that the circuits have aligned themselves with a broad,
restrictive, or intermediate position as to what constitutes an adverse
69
employment decision actionable under Title Vll. The most restrictive
view, which is followed by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, holds that
only ''ultimate employment actions" trigger protection under the
70
retaliation provision. The Second, 'fhird, and Sixth Circuits have
adopted an intermediate position, which requires that the employee
demonstrate a "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions
71
of employment."
In contrast, the First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have adopted an expansive view, which
refuses to categorically limit the types of retaliatory action that can be

64.

See cases cited supra note 13.

65.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e·2(a)(l) (2000).

Id § 2000e-3(a).
Id
See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of ''Adverse Employment
Action" in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: Mat
Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REv. 623,625-31 nn.7-13 (2003).
69. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240-42 (9th Cir. 2000).
70. Id at 1242 (citations omitted). Under the Hultimate employment decision''
standard, a negative employment action is not actionable if the decision is subsequently
reversed by the employer and the employee is put in the position he would have been in
absent the negative action. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566,576-77 (6th Cir. 2004).
71. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir.
1997)).
66.
67.
68.
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12

considered an adverse employment action.
Other courts have
73
recognized this same division among the circuits.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
in its Compliance Manual, has interpreted the retaliation provision of
Title VII to focus on whether the employer's conduct, even if it falls
short of a tennination or tangible act, would deter the reasonable
74
person from engaging in protected activity. Although the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VIT does not have the force of law, it is
75
considered persuasive evidence of congressional intent. The Manual
explains that, unlike the general antidiscrimination provisions in Title
VII, the retaliation proscription sets no qualifiers on the term "to
discriminate" and thus should be read to prohibit any discrimination
"that is reasonably likely to deter protected activity . . . There is no
requirement that the adverse action materially affect the terms,
76
conditions, or privileges of employment." Although some courts have
77
adopted the EEOC position, which tracks the First Amendment/Rutan
72. /d at 124243.
73.. Se~ e.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep 't of Corr~ Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 445-46 (2d
Cir. 1999) (discussing the disagreement among the circuits over how egregious an employer's
conduct must be to give rise to a retaliation claim under Title VII); see also Joel A. Kravetz,

Deterrence v. Material Hann: Finding the Appropriate Standard to Define an '~dverse
Action"in ReWiation Claims Brought Under the Applicable Equal Employment Opportunity
Statues, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 315, 321-54 (2002) (providing a circuit-by-circuit analysis
of retaliation claims brought under Title VII); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis
Discrimination, 41 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1126 (1998) ("[T]here is a real and growing disarray
concerning which improperly motivated employment decisions are legally actionable.").
74. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, No. 915.003 COMPLIANCE
MANuAL § 8-11(0)(3) (1998), available at http://www.eeoc.-gov/docs/retal.pdf [hereinafter
COMPLIANCE MANuAL].

75. The EEOC is the administrative enforcement arm ofTitle VII. Indeed, litigants_
are required to exhaust administrative remedies before they can pursue claims in state or
federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000). Although EEOC Guidelines are not binding on
the courts, they "constitute a body of experience and informedjudgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance." Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986) (quotation omitted). In adopting the expansive interpretation of the retaliation
provision, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the EEOC's guidance. See Ray, 217 F.3d at
1242-43.
76. COMPLIANCE MANuAL, supra note 74~ § .8, at iv.
77. See·Herrnreiter v: Chicago Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2002), cert
denied, 124 S. Ct. 472 (2003) (mem.) (noting in dictum that retaliation claims need not
involve a materially adverse employment action because_''it presumably takes rather little to
deter ... altruistic action" by employees who are making or assisting a complaint on behalf of
a coworker); Ray; 217 F.3d at 1243 ("This provision does not limit what type of
discrimination is covered, nor does it prescribe a minimum level of severity for actionable
discrimination."); Glover v. S~C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999)
("Section 704(a)'s protections ensure not only that employers cannot intimidate their
employees into foregoing the Title VII grievance process, but also that investigators will have
access to the unchilled testimony of witnesses."); Knox v.. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th
.
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approach, others have required that an employee prove the retaliatory
conduct tangibly or materially affects "terms and conditions of
78
employment" in order to be actionable, and, as noted, some have
imposed an even more stringent test, mandating that an employee
79
show she was subjected to an "ultimate employment decision."
Not surprisingly, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which have
adopted the most stringent test for employees bringing Title VII
retaliation clain1s, have also most consistently required that
goverttment employees who seek to bring First Amendment claims
80
demonstrate a "materially adverse" or "tangible" job action. The
Fifth Circuit has conceded that the demand for an "adverse
Cir. 1996) ("There is nothing in the law of retaliation that restricts the type of retaliatory act
that might be visited upon an employee who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a
complaint.").
78. In White ~Burlington Northem & Santa Fe RmJway Co., the court, in an en bane
ruling, rejected the EEOC's interpretation (five of the thirteen judges advocated its adoption)
in favor of a more limited definition of an "adverse employment action" in order "to prevent
lawsuits based upon trivialities." 364 F.3d 789, 797-800 (6th Cir. 2004). The court
acknowledged the EEOC's position that its definition excludes "'petty slights and trivial
annoyances' and anything that is not reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in
protected activity." Id Nonetheless, it concluded that its more limited definition, which
requires a materially adverse change in employment conditions, provided guidance to lower
courts and was preferable to "requiring district courts to detet n1ine on a case-by-case basis
what actions by an employer are reasonably likely to deter an employee from engaging in
protected activity." Id On the other hand, the court rejected the more restrictive "ultimate
employment decision" standard and held that the employee's suspension without pay and job
transfer were materially adverse job actions that could be brought under Title VII's retaliation
provision. Id at 801 ...04; see also Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 617-18 (lith Cir.
2004) (holding that to be considered an adverse employment action, the plaintiff must show
either an ultimate employment decision or "meet some threshold level of substantiality'');
Petersen v. Utah Dep't of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1189 (lOth Cir. 2002) (requiring that the
retaliation be a "materially adverse" employment action, and finding that neither taking an
employee "out of the infottnation loop" or unsuccessfully attempting to transfer him met this
standard); Longstreet v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 276 F. 3d 379, 383-84 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that
an employee's transfer to an allegedly more difficult position and negative perforn1ance
evaluations were not tangible job consequences and thus could not qualify as adverse
retaliatory action under Title VII); Weeks v. New York, 273 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that an employee fails to state a claim for retaliation where she does not allege what
tangible effect her transfer had on the terms and conditions of her employment), abrogated on
other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 10 I (2002); Hollins v.
Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (requiring that the plaintiff "identify a
materially adverse change in the tenns and conditions of his employment to state a claim for
retaliation under Title VII"); Munday v. Waste Mgmt. ofN. Am., 126 F. 3d 239, 243 (4th Cir.
1997) (requiring that adverse action for retaliation claims affect the terms, conditions, or
benefits of employment).
79. Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531-32 (5th Cir. 2003),
cert. demed, 124 S. Ct. 82 (2003) (mem.); Ledergerber v# Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1997).
80. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text
(discussing the ~'ultimate employment decision" requirement).
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employment action" for First Amendment litigants is less stringent
than the ''ultimate decision" test that it has imposed on Title VII
81
litigants. In Banks v. East Baton Rouge Pansh School Board, the
court explained that a retaliatory act under the First Amendment may
consist of reprimands, disciplinary filings, or a transfer tantan1ount to a
demotion, even though such conduct would not qualify as an "ultimate
82
employment decision'' under Title VII. Ultimately, however, the court
reasoned that neither the alleged "failure to promote and pay
[plaintiffs] at the appropriate rate" nor the "use of [an] inappropriate
test to block [employees] rightful positions" would be "an adverse
83
employment action" even in the First Amendment context. Being
denied a promotion and salary increase would likely chill the average
worker from engaging in protected speech, yet the court rejected
Banks' First Amendment claim that she was retaliated against for
participating in a lawsuit challenging the allegedly gender-biased
decision of the School Board to eliminate medical benefits to certain
84
employees.
Similarly, decisions from the Eighth Circuit have improperly
relied upon Title VII case precedent in detern1ining that retaliatory
85
conduct is not actionable under the First Amendment.. In Jones v.
Fitzgerald, the court held that the First Amendment plaintiff failed to
show that the retaliatory conduct resulted in a '"material employment
disadvantage' necessary to establish an adverse employment action
86
under either Title VII or§ 1983." Although Jones was subjected to an
involuntary transfer, two internal investigations, and negative
memoranda placed in her personnel file, these did not result in loss of
87
"tangible" job benefits, such as salary or job responsibilities. Further,
the investigations led to no "material" disadvantage, even if such were
88
motivated by a desire to sanction or harass Jones for her speech.
Rather than inquire as to whether such retaliatory action deters speech,
the court reasoned that in order to prove a constitutional injury, an
employee must establish "a tangible change in duties or working
81. See Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir~ 2003).
82. ld
83. Id
84. See id.; see also Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 156-61 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that investigations, public reprimands, a suspension with pay, and a transfer would
not be actionable under the First Amendment).
85. See Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d 705,713-15 (8th Cir. 2002).
86. Id at 714.
87. Id
88. Id at 714-15.
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89

conditions that constitute[s] a material disadvantage." Other Eighth
Circuit cases similarly discuss the need to show significant alteration
in the conditions of employment or "a material change in the terms
and conditions of employment" in order to establish a First
90
Amendment violation.
In addition to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the Second and
Eleventh Circuits have also borrowed Title VII terminology in
91
addressing retaliation claims tu1der the First Amendment.
1rt
Stavropoulos v. Firestone, the Eleventh Circuit stated that merely
demonstrating a chilling effect would not support a First Amendment
92
claim unless such "resulted from an adverse employment action."
Further, the retaliatory action "must involve an important condition of
93
employment." The plaintiff alleged she suffered emotional distress
when University of Georgia officials sent her negative memos,
including a mental illness memo, and encouraged faculty members
94
with negative connnents about the plaintiff to come forward. Further,
she incurred costs in seeking to review an allegedly retaliatory decision
95
to terminate her employment. Nonetheless, the court relied on Title
VII case precedent, "because the standards are consonant,'' and·
concluded that the ''harm" was too insubstantial because the decision
96
was eventually overridden by other agents of the university.
Similarly, in Phillips v. Bowen, the Second Circuit reasoned that a
89. ld at 713 (quotation omitted). In its analysis, the court suggested that the internal
investigations were ''warranted" and that there_was no "fabrication or factual inaccuracies in
the memoranda pJaced in her personnel file." Jd at 715. This evidence is relevant to the
question of retaliatory motive, but the court's analysis cuts off this inquiry and denies the
plaintiff the opportunity to present her case to a jury. ld at 716.
90. See Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that -"minor
shifts in employment responsibility did not significantly alter the conditions" of the plaintiff's
employment); Meyers v. Neb. Health & Hwnan Servs., 324 F.3d 655, 660 (8th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the retaliatory employment action must be ~'a material change in the tenns or
conditions of ... employment" to be actionable); Bechtel v. City of Belton, 250 E3d 1157,
1162 (8th Cir. 200 I) (holding that "an adverse employment action must effectuate a material
change in the tem1s or conditions of . . . employment" in order to establish a First
Amendment violation (quotation omitted)).
91.
See Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 619 (11th Cir. 2004); Phillips v.
Bowen, 278 E3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002).
92. 361 F.3dat 619.
93. Id The court explained that its "dual'~ test chilling effect and alteration of an
important condition of employment was necessary to ensure injury in fact. Jd at 620~
Although the Supreme Court has held that subjective chill is insufficient to create standing,
the Rutan Court defined injury solely in terms of an objective standard, thus obviating this
purported justiciability question. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 73-76 ( 1990).
94.
Stavropoulos, 361 F.3dat 616-18.
95.
Seeid at 615.
96. Id at 619~21.
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combination of minor incidents can form the basis of a constitutional
retaliation claim if they reach a "critical mass;' but it also stated that a
First Amendment plaintiff must show that "the total circlJmstances of
[the] working environment changed to become unreasonably inferior
97
and adverse when compared to a typical or normal . . . workplace."
The focus of the appellate court on the need for a "critical mass of
unreasonable inferiority," although understandable to ensure that minor
incidents of retaliation do not flood the courts, deviates from the core
98
question of whether the harassment would chill speech.
As previously discussed, many courts, as well as the EEOC, have
detertnined that interpreting the retaliation clause in Title Vll to require
materially adverse changes in the terms and conditions of employment
is not warranted in light of the provision's clear text and congressional
99
history. It is even more inappropriate to superimpose this restrictive
interpretation of Title Vll on First Amendment litigants. The Supreme
Court has not vacillated from the core principle that, absent strong
countervailing interests, government should not be permitted to deter
100
employees from exercising their First Amendment rights. In addition
to case precedent, policy concerns favor a more protective standard
where First Amendment rights are implicated. Those courts and
cormnentators who have urged a restrictive interpretation of Title Vll's
retaliation provision have emphasized their concern that federal courts
not become embroiled in the everyday decisionmaking process of

97.

278 F. 3d I 03, 109 (2d Cir. 2002). In instructing the jury, the district court

acknowledged that "[a] position may become unreasonably inferior if there are repeated and
severe incidents of harassment that, taken as a whole, would probably deter an average person
from the exercise of their First Amendment rights." Id
98. See id. In Deters v. LafUente, another Second Circuit panel similarly borrowed
Title VII doctrine and used it to deny employees' claims that they were subjected to a hostile
work environment in retaliation for engaging in protected speech. 368 F.3d 185, 189-90 (2d
Cir. 2004). Citing Title VII case precedent, the court found no pattern of constant
harassment, but it failed to ask whether the action was nonetheless sufficient to deter
protected speech. Id In the Title VTI context, harassment must be truly egregious in order to
demonstrate a change in "terms or conditions of employment.'' A similar showing should not
be imposed on First Amendment litigants. See Levinson, supra note 68, at 623-24.
99. The EEOC has argued that "[i]n enacting section 2000e-3, Congress
unmistakably intended to ensure that no person would be deterred from exercising his rights
under Title VII by the threat of discriminatory retaliation." EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 E3d
541,543 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Levinson, supra note 68, at 651-52 C'Congress intentionally
refused to adopt a more restrictive retaliation provision, recognizing that employees are
unlikely to come forward to complain of discrimination against them or another employee if
they believe such action will be met with retaliation in any fonn.").
100. See supra Part II.
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101

But when it is a government employer that is
retaliating against an employee for challenging the operation of a
government agency, the federal judiciary has a significant role to play
in safeguarding the public's right to receive critical information and in
protecting those who engage in political debate, including goverrunent
employees who have a unique access to information that is of public
102
concern. Once it is recognized that the adverse employment action
would chill a reasonable employee from engaging in protected speech,
the severity of' the retaliatory conduct may affect dan1ages, but it
103
should not affect liability.
IV RETALIATORY ACTION THAT CHILLS SPEECH INFRINGES ON 'I'HE
FIRST AM:END:MENT RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT Elv1PLOYEES

In addressing constitutional rights violations, the Supreme Court
in recent years has moved toward a more nuanced balancing approach
in lieu ofthe rigid fundamental right/strict scrutiny analysis reflected in
104
Warren Court decisions.
In the context of govermnent employee
10 l. See Donna Smith Cude & Bryan M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses?
Unlawfill Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It UOlen They
See It?, 14 LAB. LAW. 373, 407-12 (1998); see also Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85
F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (predicting if Title VII is broadly interpreted to reach any
adverse employment action, "[t]he Equal Employment Opportunity Cotnmission, already
staggering under an avalanche of filings too heavy for it to cope with, would be crushed, and
serious complaints would be lost among the trivial"); Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
63 F. 3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he employment-discrimination laws have not vested in
the federal courts the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or
fairness of the business judgments made by employers ....").
102. See Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 821 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Title VII
limitations and noting that "[t]here is after all a difference between placing all but the tiniest
employers in the nation, most of which are private, tmder a comprehensive regime of
antidiscrimination law, and merely forbidding persons acting under color of state law to
infringe constitutional rights").
103. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (explicating this
liability/damages distinction in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim).
104. See Lawrence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The uFrmdamental Right', That Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1893, 1933-45 (2004). There has been significant
criticism of the Court's use of balancing tests. For example, conservative Justice Antonin
Scalia has vociferously attacked "ad hoc" balancing and has argued for "bright line" rules to
reign in the exercise of judicial discretion. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHf. LJ REv. 1175, 1177-81 (1989). Ironically, this same aversion to balancing
was a distinctive feature of the liberal Warren Court; at that time, the concern was that
balancing would not be sufficiently protective of free speech interests. See MARTIN H.
REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 226 (1984); see also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, ConS.titutional Law in the Age ofBalancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972-76, 992-94
( 1987) (arguing that courts lack objective criteria for weighing or comparing competing
interests and thus subjectivity will determine how the balance will be struck). The liberal
Justices on the Rehnquist Court are now advocating a "balancing" test to avoid the minimal
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speech, a balancing test was long ago adopted by the Court. Since
1968, the Court has recognized that although employees have the right
to comment on matters of public concern and the public has a
significant interest in receiving this c_ommunication, courts_must also
take into consideration the interests of the state, as an employer, in
106
promoting the efficiency of the services it performs.
The Court has not made it easy for govenmtent employees to
succeed under the Pickering~ Connick test. Initially government
employees must demonstrate that their speech addresses a matter of
107
public concem.
Satisfying this criterion means that only speech
involving public issues, speech that occupies the "highest rung of the
108

hierarchy of First Amendment values;' will be protected. Further,
even where an employee's speech is deemed to be "of public concern;'
scrutiny used when the majority fmds no fundamental right or no "infringement" of a
fundamental right. Thus, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that Texas's same-sex
sodomy law violates substantive due process because it impermissibly interferes with the
liberty interest of individuals to enter into personal relationships without being punished as
criminals. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). The Court did not identify a "fundamental" privacy
interest; rather, it simply concluded that the liberty clause provides substantial protection to
adult citizens in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. Id
Rather than apply "strict scrutiny," the majority simply stated that the state's interests were
insufficient to outweigh the liberty interest in engaging in consensual sexual conduct without
risking criminal sanctions. ld
105. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The need to balance
competing fundamental values and interests is reflected in other First Amendment doctrine.
For example, ·in the defamation area, the Court recognized the competing First Amendment
interests and the States' "strong and legitimate . . . interest[s] in compensating private
individuals for injury to reputation." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49
(1974). In Bartnicki v. W>pper, Justice Stevens reasoned that ''privacy concerns give way
when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance." 532 U.S. 514,
534 (200 1). The Court held that although disclosure of information obtained by intercepting
telephone communications is a significant intrusion on privacy, imposing liability when the
person publishing the information did not illegally obtain it and where the conversation
addressed a public issue would violate_the First Amendment. ld at 535.
106. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
107. See Connick v. Myers; 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983). Although the question of
what speech should be deemed a ·matter of public concern has raised difficult questions, see
supra notes 29 and 34 and accompanying text, to the extent this Article addresses whistleblowing, appellate courts have consistently held that sp-eech that alleges government
corruption or malfeasance is of public concern. See Spiegla v. Hull, 371 E3d 928, 937 (7th
Cir. 2004); see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 369 F.3d 826, 830-31 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating
that speech reporting sexual harassment is always a matter of public concern "even when
made both as a citizen and as an employee").
I 08. Connick, 461 U.S.. at 145 (internal quotations and citations omitted). On the
other hand, the Court also explained that when an employee's speech relates to a matter of
personal interest rather than a matter of public concern, absent the most unusual
circumstances, a public agency's personnel decisions will not be subject to judicial review.
/d. at 147. Much criticism has been leveled at this requirement as being too vague,
subjective, and restrictive. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 50-51.
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the court may detertnine that it is so inherently or actually disruptive of
109
.goverrunent's ability to function that it will not be protected.
Additionally, the court may find that there is no causal connection
110
between the speech and the negative action, or that the employer
would have taken the same action even if the employee had not
1
engaged in the protected speech.• t In short, there are numerous
obstacles in place that discourage employees from bringing
purportedly "frivolous" suits and that safeguard the government's
112
interest in protecting the workplace.
Concededly, as with all federally protected rights, there must be
an ". ··. gement" in order for government wrongdoing to rise to a.
constitutional level. However, the Supreme Court ruled long ago that
an · · gement of the First Amendment occurs whenever an
employer's conduct would deter a reasonable employee from
113
.exercising her rights.
Lower courts have recognized that some
retaliatory conduct may be so trivial or inconsequential that it cannot
114
be said to "chill" speech. But this determination should not be based
109. See supm note 30 and accompanying text; see also Belcher v~ City ofMcAlester,
324 F.3d 1203,, 1208-09 (lOth Cir. 2003) (fmding employer's action had a chilling effect on
speech, but concluding, under the Pickering balance, that the government's interest
outweighed the importance ofthe employee's speech).
110. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see
cases cited supra note 37; cf. Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F. 3d 928, 941-92 (7th Cir. 2004)
(acknowledging that plaintiff must establish a causal link between the contested speech and
the adverse employment action, but clarifying that the burden is to prove only that protected
activity was a motivating factor, not but~for causation as recited in earlier cases). An
employment action may be so trivial that it cannot be said to reflect retaliatory animus. This
is very different, however, from saying that certain types of retaliatory conduct are not
actionable, regardless of retaliatory motive, simply because they do not constitute a material
change in the terms or conditions of employment.
111. See Spiegla, 371 F. 3d at 93 5.; see also Wells, supra note 2, at 971 (citing cases that
demonstrate employers; ability to come up with· some-evidence of insubordinate behavior or
other misconduct and to demonstrate that that was a detern1inative cause ofthe dismissal).
112. See WelJs, supra note 2, at 957-59 ("[T]he general fragility of First Amendment
rights is exacerbated in this obstacle-laden remedial scheme."). Professor Wells describes the
restrictions imposed by the Court under the Pickering/ Connick balance~ as well as the
restrictions imposed in bringing retaliatory suits under § 1983. Id
113. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 73 (1990).
114. See, e.g., Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 872-76 (9th Cir. 1998).
Although the Ninth Circuit has been highly protective of employees'' free speech claims, it
has made it clear that retaliatory action may be so insignificant that it would not deter the
.exercise of First Amendment rights. Id In Nunez, the court rejected claims of a plaintiff who
alleged only that he had been bad-mouthed and verbally threatened by his employer. Jd at
875; see also Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 E3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (''The essential
holding of NW1ez is simply that when an employer's response includes only minor acts, such
as 'bad-mouthing,' that cannot reasonably be expected to deter protected speech, such acts do
not violate an employee's First Amendment rights."). Other circuits have taken a similar
approach. See Eaton & Meneley, 379 F.3d 949, 954-56 (lOth Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the
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on whether an employee can meet some threshold mechanical standard
of a tangible or substantially adverse harm to employment, which has
been applied in some circuits to limit protection for government
115
employeeS. Indeed, the retaliatory action should not have to relate to
the job at all, but rather impennissibly motivated nonemployment
conduct, such as bringing false civil or criminal actions against an
employee for engaging in protected speech, should also be viewed as a
116
violation of the First Amendment
The question of what actions by an employer are reasonably
likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity will
have to be decided on a case-by-case basis, but the definition of a
"materially adverse'' employment action triggers the same fact
objective standard of a person of ordinary frrmness is rigorous and ''a trivial or de minimis
injury will not support a retaliatory prosecution claim" (quotation omitted)); sheriff's conduct
in running criminal background checks on plaintiffs who attempted to remove him from
office would not chill the actions of those who enter the arena of political debate); Naucke v.
City of Park Hills, 284 E3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that even if the harassing
comments made about the plaintiff were offensive, unprofessional, and inappropriate, the
embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress the plaintiff allegedly endured would be
insufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to speak out, and, in fact,
the record demonstrated that the plaintiff continued to speak on numerous occasions); Suppan
v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that "[i]t would trivialize the First
Amendment to hold that harassment for exercising the right of free speech was always
actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordinary fmnness from that exercise"
(quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 E2d 622, -625 (7th Cir. 1982))). Concerns about trivializing the
First Amendment or unjustified federal intervention into personnel matters should be allayed
by proper application of this "chilling effect" standard. Superimposing Title VII requirements
on First Amendment retaliation litigants is unnecessary, as well as inappropriate.
115. See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
116. See Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F. 3d 484, 488-89 (1Oth Cir. 1996) (holding that
prosecution motivated by a desire to discourage protected speech violates the First
Amendment); see also Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
adverse action in the First Amendment context is not limited to employment decisions). Note
that even in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, some courts have-recognized that the
retaliation provision is broad enough to cover actions that are not employment related. For
example, the Seventh Circuit has held that "non-employment activities such as brickthrowing, tire-slashing or other unfortunate acts," which would not have occurred but for the
employee's exercise of protected rights may be brought under Title VII. See Schobert v. Ill.
Dep't ofTransp., 304 F.3d 725, 733-34 (7th Cir., 2002); see also Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co.,
241 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir~ 2001) (acknowledging that the filing of false_police reports would
violate the retaliation provision); Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F. 3d 881, 892 (7th Cir.
1996) (finding that retaliatory motivated threats of violence and tort civil actions could be
brought under Title VII); Berry v. Stevenson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (lOth Cir.- 1996)
(holding that a malicious prosecution action brought against a former employee constitutes an
adverse employment action for purposes of retaliation claim); cf. Chock v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 113 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the employer's alleged
obstruction of an employee's studies for an M.B.A.. and his attempt to prevent the employee
from living with his direct supervisor were not adverse employment actions because neither
involved benefits of his employment).
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117

intensive consideration. Further, lower courts have at their disposal
some forty years of case precedent defining when govenrment action
118
chills speech.
Obviously, the magnitude of the hartn is a key
criterion in detertnining whether a reasonable employee would be
deterred from engaging in First Amendment activity. However,
superimposing Title VII requirements on First Amendment litigants
simply means that some retaliation claims will be rejected even though
the conduct in question would chill the exercise of protected speech,
contrary to the purposes and goals of that Amendment.
Once a court has determined that the government employer
intended to punish speech (retaliatory motive) and that he has
subjected the employee to adverse action that chills speech (an
· · gement), the question of how severely an employer has harmed
119
the employee should play no role in the Pickering- Connickbalance.
Allowing employees to be subjected to harassing, retaliatory conduct,
just because such conduct does not "substantially change the terms and
conditions of their employment," will not promote the efficiency of
government. To the contrary, it sends a dangerous message to
employers that they can penalize and thus deter speech with
impunity a message that clearly affects employee morale and cuts off
debate that could improve the efficacy of government. Further, the
fact that the retaliatory conduct falls short of a dismissal or other
"tangible" action does not negate the finding of an infringement117. See, e.g., Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that the existence of a materially adverse employment action cannot be defined
by any "list" because courts must consider "indices that might be unique to a particular
situation"). Even if Title VII's more stringent test might add some clarity, this is an
insufficient justification for restricting First Amendment rights.
118. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,73 (1990); see a/so cases cited supra
note 114.
119. However, in Gross v. Norton, the court reasoned that a less serious adverse
employment action may decrease the burden on the government employer to justify its action.
120 F. 3d 877, 879 (8th Cir. 1997). In this case, the retaliatory conduct consisted of the city
merely delaying the plaintiff's testimony before the Minnesota legislature by a few days, and
thus the court reasoned that a First Amendment violation had not occurred. ld It may be that
this action would not chill the reasonable employee from engaging in speech, but this author
contends that this is an inquiry that should not affect other aspects of First Amendment
analysis, including shifting burdens of proof. If a constitutional infringement has occurred,
the magnitude of that infringement should not affect the balance. This should be contrasted
to the Court's approach in Connick, which suggested that the importance of the speech would
detennine whether government must show disruptive potential or actual disruption of the
workplace in order to justify infringing on speech. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154
(1983). Because the importance of the speech and the public's need to receive this
communication is one of the two aspects of the Pickenng balance, making this a criterion
which affects the government's burden has some justification.
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courts should not recognize a "de minimis" exception where critical
120
First Amendment rights are at stake. Rather, the extent of the injury
121
should be addressed only with regard to damages.
Two examples using this approach and expressly rejecting Title
VII standards are noteworthy. In Coszalter v. City ofSalem, the Ninth
Circuit held that, for First Amendment retaliation claims, the adverse
employment action "need not be severe and it need not be of a certain
122
kind." The court recognized that although retaliatory action may be
so insi · icant that it does not deter the exercise of F:.tst Amendment
rights, the court rejected the use of any "exclusive, category-based
limitation on the kind of retaliatory action that is actionable under the
123
First Amendment." The court reasoned that a disciplinary investigation, a transfer to new duties, a criminal investigation, repeated and
ongoing verbal harassment and humiliation, an unpleasant work
assigtnnent, and withholding of customary public recognition would
be, either individually and certainly cumulatively, sufficient to sustain
124
a First Amendment retaliation claim. It sufficed that the defendant's

120. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2323 (2004)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("There are no de minimis violations of the Constitution no
constitutional harms so slight that the courts are obliged to ignore them."); cf Eaton v.
Meneley, 379 F.3d 949, 955 (lOth Cir. 2004) (quoting Tenth Circuit precedent that "de
minimis injury will not support a retaliatory prosecution"); White v. Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2004) (en bane) ("Employment actions that are de
minimis are not actionable under Title Vll.").
121. See Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1996) (fmding that an
employee who alleges that her reputation, opportunities for advancement, and earning
potential were impaired by her employer's acts may proceed with her First Amendment claim;
further, allegation that the employee endured a campaign of harassment that "caused her great
worry and unhappiness," constituted compensable injury, even if such did not include
monetary losses because emotional distress is a legally recognized and compensable harm;
fmally, even where a litigant does not prove actual compensable injury, she may be entitled to
an award of nominal damages if she proves violation of a substantive constitutional right); see
also Wells, supra note 2, at 1015-18 (arguing that § 1983 damage rules are too restrictive, in
particular with regard to retaliation claims, in that the law provides no vehicle for recognizing
the harm done to the public interest when government employee speech is punished).
Although the Supreme Court in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 471 U.S.
299, 307 ( 1986), recognized that harm in First Amendment retaliation cases may include
injuries such as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering, Professor Wells contends that this ignores the intrinsic actual losses that occur
whenever free speech rights are violated. Wells, supra note 2, at 1018. He suggests an award
of presumed or pwtitive damages when compensatory damages fail to "capture the full cost
of the harm done by a constitutional violation." ld at 1019.
122. 320 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2003).
123. ld
124. Jd at 976-77.
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action was "reasonably likely to deter'' employees from engaging in
125
protected activity.
Similarly, in Power v. Summers, the Seventh Circuit specifically
contrasted federal employment discrimination statutes, which limit
protection to victims of materially adverse employment action, from
constitutional claims where any deprivation that is likely to deter the
126
exercise of free speech should be actionable. The court noted that
under the First Amendment adverse action is not limited to
employment, but rather includes any retaliatory conduct that
127
effectively deters ''exercise of a fragile liberty." Thus, the district
court erred in denying retaliation claims brought by university
professors based on its finding that raises were discretionary and thus
their reduction was not an adverse employment action. Even though
the reduction involved hundreds, not thousands, of dollars, the critical
question was whether the reduction was in retaliation for the fact that
the professors had been ' 'outspoken" on issues of faculty salaries, and
whether such reduction was sufficient to deter the exercise of free
speech~
The court recognized that '"a campaign of petty harassment'
and 'even minor forms of retaliation,' 'diminished responsibility, or
129
false accusations' can be actionable under the First Amendment."
128

V

CONCLUSION

Retaliatory action, including threats, the reduction of
discretionary raises, involuntary transfers, negative memoranda placed
in a personnel file, internal investigations; public reprimands,
suspension with pay, or nonemployment related forms of harassment
may chill the ordinary person from engaging in speech, even if such
would not be considered a material or tangible change in the tem1s and
conditions of employment.. Yet, employees facing these types of
retaliatory action have had their First Amendment claims dismissed in
some circuits simply because they failed to meet the heightened injury
standard imposed on Title VII litigants. This Article contends that
125. ld at 976.
126. 226 F.3d 815, 820-21 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Rivera-Jimenez v. Pierluisi, 362
F.3d 87, 94 (lst Cir. 2004) ("[T]he standard for showing an adverse employment action is
lower in the First Amendment retaliation context than it is in other contexts (such as Title Vll)
... and the Supreme Court has indicated that even relatively minor events might give rise to
liability.").
127. Power, 226 E3d at 820.
128. ld at 820-21.
129. Id at 821 (citing DeGUiseppe v. Vill. of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 192 (7th Cir.
1995)) (quotations omitted).
.

.

.
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whenever the retaliatory action meets the threshold "chilling" or
deterrence level, a court should address the magnitude of the injury
caused by the retaliatory conduct only at the damages phase. Those
circuits that have deviated from this standard have ignored clear
Supreme Court precedent and have violated core First Amendment
principles. It is critical that the Supreme Court step in to reaffirm the
Rutan standard so that government employees will continue to freely
contribute to the public debate on speech that lies at the core of the
First Amendment speech that is necessary to democratic self-

government

